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~urru:.LYJ£. t.,ulJRT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCE~ T. WIGHTMAN, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant,) 
vs. ) 
Case No. 9987 
BETTILYON'S, INC. and ) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, ) 
Defendants- ) 
Respondents. 
) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal 
injury resulting from a fall on a public sidewalk. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendants' Motions 
for Summary Judgment. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the 
trial court's Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accepted the Statement of Facts 
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in Appellant's Brief as the statement was drawn 
from the record, but objected to additional facts 
outside of but not contradicted by the record on 
which appellant would rely. Appellant's position 
is that the discovery documents before the trial 
court did not deal with many issues of fact, and 
therefore, the record was insufficient for the 
Court to grant Summary Judgment. Appellant has set 
out what she claims the material facts l-Jere which 
the trial court did not consider. Respondents 
argue at pages 2 and 3 of their Brief: 
" The burden rests upon the resisting party 
1to raise a credible issue or show that he has 
evidence not then available, otherwise a Sum-
mary Judgment may be properly rendered for 
the moving party.' Dupler v. Yates, 10 U.2d 
251, 269, 351 P.2d 624. An unverified com-
plaint was held in that case to be sufficient 
to raise a ~redible issue.' 
* * * 
'~hen the resisting party's standing in 
court is challenged through the Summary Judg-
ment procedure, he is then required to place 
before the court those facts which he claims 
are sufficient to raise a credible issue.'' 
Respondents grossly misquote the Dupler case. 
The entire sentence quoted above reads: 
'~here, as in the instant case, the materials 
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presented by the moving party are sufficient 
to entitle him to a direct verdict and the 
opposing party fails either to offer counter-
affidavits or other materials that raise a 
credible issue or to show that he has evidence 
not then available, Summary Judgment may be 
rendered for the moving party." (Emphasis added) 
Respondents argue that by simply moving for Summary 
Judgment~ the resisting party is then required to 
place before the Court !!! facts on all issues, even 
though the moving party's material~ deal only with 
some facts on some issues. The Dupler eRse indieat~s 
that counte~measures are necessary only when the 
moving party's materials are sufficient to decide 
all issues. See Christensen v. Financial Service 
£2. (1953) 14 U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, where this 
Court said: 
"The adverse party • • • may serve opposing 
affidavits but is not required to do so. He 
may stand on his pleadings provided his 
allegations, if proved, would establish a 
basis for recovery." 
Thus all appellant says is that the record before 
the trial court did not present materials sufficient 
to enable the trial court to conclude, as it did, 
that the ~eeds growing upon Bettilyon's property were 
natural growth, or that appellant had a safe and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
convenient route available to her which she failed 
to take. Appellant's Brief sets out what the facts 
not before the trial court actually l~ere, simply to 
show that questions of fact do exist in which 
respondents presented no record and, therefore, 
Summary Judgment should not have been granted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULIKG AS A MATTER 
OF LAW DEFENDANT BETTILYON 1 S, INC. HAD NO DUTY 
TO ELIMINATE NATURL\L GROt.JTH OF WEEDS OVER THE 
PUBLIC SIDEWALl< AND THAT THE WEEDS WERE 
NATURAL GROWTH. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NUISANCE IS PERMISSIBLE. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF 
CONTRillUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FIND!~~ PLAINTIFF ASSUMED 
THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW DEFENDANT BETTIL YON'S, INC. HAD NO DUTY 
TO ELIMINATE NATURAL GRO\-JTH OF WEEDS OVER 
PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC SIDEWALK AND THA~ THE 
WEEDS ~JERE NATURAL GROWTH. 
Respondents cite Giles v. Walker (England, 
1890), 24 Q.B. Div. 656, an action for failure to 
control thistles growing on defendant's land 
following cultivation and disuse 1·1hen the thistles 
blew onto plaintiff's land. The court's decision 
is certainly not well reasoned for the decision, 
in its entirety, says: 
"I never heard of such an action as this. 
There can be no duty between adjoining 
occupiers to cut the thistles, which are the 
natural growth of the soil." 
That rule might be proper for rural areas, 
particularly since in Giles defendant would have 
had to control thistles on his entire farm to 
prevent harm to plaintiff. But that case should 
not apply to an occupier of land abutting the 
public sidewalk in the city where lots are 
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6 
relatively small. To require urban abutters to 
cut high weeds merely along the sidewalk is 
reasonable l·Jhen compared to the great risk 
to pedestrians if they are not cut. Someone 
must cut them, and the abutter is best able to 
do so. 
Respondents cite Michalson v. Nutting (Mass., 
1931), 175 N.E. 490 (Respondents' Brief, p. 5), 
\-lhere tree roots grel-1 from defendant's land to 
plaintiff's land causing damage, and the court 
dismissed the action saying planting of trees is 
a reasonable use of land and plaintiff could have 
cut off the intruding roots. Respondents admit 
the weeds here were an "inconvenience and annoyance" 
(Respondents 1 Brief, p. 16) and caused a "danger 
which lurked on either side of the sidel>Jalk" 
(Respondents• Brief, p. 25), but respondent 
Bettilyon 1 s seeks to escape responsibility by 
saying, "The city had the right, if not the duty, 
to cut offending weeds." (Respondents' Brief, 
p. 6,) But what does the fact that the city also 
has the duty, as the Michalson case says, have to 
do with Bettilyon's duty to appellant? As 
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bet~een land occupier and a member of the public 
using the public side\o~alk, the land occupier should 
have the duty. Respondent Bettilyon's citation of 
the Michalson case would indicate that the duty 
should be placed on members of the public. Further-
more, the Michalson case says the trees were a 
reasonable use of land; it does not say that main-
taining '"eeds on a public sidewalk is a reasonable 
use. 
Respondents' Brief (p. 8} says that Section 
38-1-0 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which 
enjoins any person "having control of any premises 
to • • • permit on the sidewalk any • • • filth, 
rubbish, refuse matter, ice, water, mud ••• , 
dead trees, tree stumps • • • or other things 
• • • ", does not apply to this case because weeds 
or natural growth is not mentioned. Certainly 
dead trees and tree stumps are natural growth. 
Certainly weeds can grow onto the sidewalk just as 
ice, water and mud can collect there by force of 
nature. Certainly weeds come within "filth, 
rubbish and refuse matter." Obviously the 
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Ordinance was intended to require abutters to keep 
the sidewalk clear, and respondent Bettilyon's 
violated that Ordinance. 
Berger v. Salt Lake City (1920), 56 U. 403, 
191 P. 233, incorrectly cited by respondents at 
page 9 as 191 P. 223, is not helpful here. There 
the court held the city has no duty to remove 
natural accumulations of snow and ice from the 
sidewalk because othe~1ise an unreasonable and 
impossible burden would be placed upon the city. 
the court made that distinction imminently clear 
when it recited that the precise question to be 
determined t-1as: 
"Do the ordinary rules of lat-1 respecting 
the duty of cities and to~ms to exercise 
ordinary care and diligence to maintain the 
streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe 
condition and free from dangerous obstructions 
apply to natural and ordinary accumulations 
of snot-1 and ice?" (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents' attempt to distinguish Safeway 
Stores, Inc, v. Billings (Okla., 1959), 335 P.2d 
636 (incorrectly cited by respondents as 353 
P.2d), where a pedestrian tripped over a tree 
felled from defendant's land across the sidewalk, 
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on the grounds "defendant had created the condition 
by his affirmative act,'' (Respondents' Brief, 
p. 10 ). That is contrary to the facts of the case, 
for the court said at 335 P.2d 638: 
"It is clear, however, that Safeway Stores, 
Inc. or its contractor for the construction of 
the store building, did not cut down any of 
the remaining trees on the block until in 
October after this accident in August." 
Thus, that decision does not rest on an affirmative 
act but as the court said, on the "duty to persons 
lawfully using the walk not to create or maintain 
••• an obstruction on the public way. 11 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Respondents• argument at page 12 of their Brief 
to the effect that weeds are natural grol.Jth even 
when growing because the land was previously 
cultivated is effectively met by the definition of 
natural condition of the land contained in 
Restatement of Torts, Section 363, Comment B Yhich 
says: 
'''Natural condition of the land 1 is • • • 
also used to include the natural growth of 
• • • weeds • • • upon land not artificially 
made receptive thereto." 
Respondents do not answer appellant's contention 
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at page 22 of her Brief that Bettilyon's actively 
caused weeds to grow along the side\-lalk by erect-
ing a fence at the sidewalk edge which would cause 
weed seeds to drop at the fence and cause all high 
weeds between the fence and sidewalk to fall over 
onto the sid~o~alk. 
Thus the trial court erred when it ruled that 
respondent Bettilyon 1 s had no duty to eliminate 
weeds growing over the sidewalk, and further 
erred when it ruled that the weeds were natural 
growth. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NUISANCE IS PERMISSIBLE. 
Respondents argue that plaintiff is raising 
nuisance for the first time on appeal and should 
not be permitted to do so. 
Although the Complaint does not use the word 
"nuisance," it does refer to an "obstructed con-
dition on such side\'lalku (R. 1). Since Section 
78-38-1, u. C.A., 1953, defines a nuisance to 
include obstructions, and since Rule 8(a), U.R.C.P., 
requires only "a short and plain statement of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
claim," respondents were given adequate notice in 
appellant's Complaint of her claim. It is not 
necessary to specifically say ••nuisance." A 
Complaint is required only to give the opposing 
party fair notice of the nature and basis of the 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of 
the type o.f 1 itigation involved. Blackham v. 
Snelgrove (1955), 3 U.2d 157, 280 P.2d 453. By 
Rule 8(e) (1), "No technical forms of pleadings 
or motions are required, 11 and by Rule 8 (f), 
11All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice." 
Even so, by Rule 15(b): 
11The court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be served thereby and 
the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. 11 
Respondents do not claim they have been prejudiced 
because they have not been prejudiced in this 
instance. They have fully replied in their Brief 
to appellant's allegations of nuisance, and this 
appeal still \·1ould have been brought because 
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Summary Judgment was granted also upon the grounds 
that appellant was contributorily negligent and 
assumed the risk (R. 28). Those latter two 
grounds had to be a basis for the trial court's 
Judgment since respondent Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion brought its motion only upon those latter 
two grounds (R. 26). Both cases cited by 
respondents' Brief (p. 13, 14) deal with cases 
where appellant changed the theory of the case 
after evidence and instructions to the jury had 
been concluded. In these cases respondent was 
prejudiced by new theory being raised, but not 
in this instance. 
Cannon v. Newberger, 1 U.2d 396, 399, 268 
P.2d 425 (Respondents' Brief, p. 15) holds only 
that natural growth on an abutter's property can 
be a nuisance and that the question is one of 
fact in each instance. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF ASSUMED 
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THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Respondents' argument as to contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk is entirely based upon 
three facts, being (1) appellant was generally 
aware of the weeds, (2) walked through and fell, (3) 
even though she might have walked around them. 
Therefore, respondents say she was not entitled to 
try her case to a jury. That entire argument is 
effectively met by cases from other jurisdictions 
cited in Appellant's Brief. However, Baker v. 
Decker (1949), 117 U. 15, 212 P.2d 679, which 
case was not discovered in appellant's counsel's 
research for her original Brief, is decisive. There 
plaintiff tenant walked along a hotel hall and came 
upon a table, a canvas dropcloth and a paste bucket 
which defendant painter had left in the hall. She 
noticed the canvas covering the floor and stepped on 
it with her left foot. In bringing her right foot 
forl-lard, she either misjudged the height of the canvas 
or caught her right heel in a fold of the covering 
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and tripped. Defendants said plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of la'~ either 
because she failed to use due care in proceeding 
over the equipment or because she failed to take 
another readily available route through the halls. 
This Court said, beginning at 212 P.2d 682: 
''It is well settled that mere knol-lledge 
that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, 
is not sufficient to establish contributory 
negligence though there is another way that 
is safe and convenient, and to defeat 
recovery it must appear that the traveler 
knew or as an ordinarily cautious person 
should have ltnown that it was imprudent to 
use the walk • • • • The danger portrayed 
by the manner in which the equipment was 
placed in the hall was not so serious that 
plaintiff can be charged with indiscretion 
or lack of due care in not deviating from 
her usual course of exit from the building. 
The hallway was for the use of the tenants, 
the absence of barricades would lead a person 
to believe the route was not dangerous, the 
presence of the table, canvas and bucket would 
not suggest exposure to injury, and if plain-
tiff believed that by using ordinary care she 
could transverse the hallway in safety, she 
was not negligent. Plaintiff did not know 
she was taking an extraordinary risk, and she 
had no idea that she was traveling over an 
unsafe course and no reason to suspect a 
hazardous condition. • • • Under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, it was for 
the jury to determine whether or not plain-
tiff exercised due care and caution when she 
elected to continue dolm the hallway on the 
second floor rather than to proceed by a 
route not usually traveled by her. l·Je cannot 
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contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
by reason of her choice of route •••• 
"The only evidence touching on con-
tributory negligence uas given by the 
plaintiff and it deals with her seeing the 
canvas on the floor, stepping over the 
'rumpled end 1 to~ith her left foot and catch-
ing the heel of her right shoe in a hole or 
in a bunched part of the canvas. The exact 
manner in which her heel became enmeshed in 
the folds or checked by the end of the canvas 
cannot be determined. Hot·lever, Mrs. Baker 
eith~r miscalculated the thickness or the 
uneven heights of the folds and failed to 
step high enough to clear the top or had her 
heel caught in a hole formed by the folds. 
11 In passing over the canvas, Mrs. Baker 
is charged with exercising that degree of 
care uhich a prudent person would exercise 
under those particular circumstances, and 
as a general rule, the degree of care she 
was required to exercise would be in 
proportion to the danger suggested by the 
presence of the articles on the floor. 
Here, the danger or hazards were slight 
and extraordinary vigilance was not required. 
The situation was largely static, so no great 
potentialities or harm were apparent, and 
Mrs. Baker was not hurrying or rushing down 
the hall. She was conscious of her duty 
to use due care in passing over the carpet 
covering. She was bound to exercise her 
sense of sight, but the ordinary use of this 
sense does not require that she exactly 
calculate or determine every possible means 
of escaping injury. There is a zone of 
probable error permitted to her before she 
can be charged as a matter of law with not 
having used due care, and the determination 
of this zone is a jury function. n 
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The Baker case is exactly in point as to choice 
of routes and as to negligence in falling while 
going through the weeds or canvas. It holds 
those questions are for the jury. Therefore, 
the trial court erred in ruling summarily that 
appellant was contributorily negligent and 
assumed the risk as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, t~ORSLEY, SNOt·1 & 
CHRISTENSEN and 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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